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Effective Representation and
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INTRODUCTION

In a representative state government, those who draw the boundaries of the state's election districts wield considerable power. Unchecked, legislators responsible for creating plans of apportionment
might abuse this power by acting improperly, either in their own in* Copyright held by the
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terests or to the detriment of their constituents. This is simply one
drawback to a system where the majority rules.
The federal and state constitutions, as countermajoritarian documents, are drafted to provide checks on the potential for discriminatory abuse of power by the ruling majority. 1 Accordingly, many
restrictions are promulgated under the Constitution of the United
States and the various state constitutions to curb any impropriety in
the redistricting process. 2 State constitutions may also provide redistricting guidelines designed to provide administrative convenience and
serve other local goals. 3 Common examples of these restrictions are
compactness, contiguity, and the respect of political boundaries when
4
drawing the boundaries of legislative districts.
In July 1992, the Nebraska Supreme Court was presented the opportunity to interpret a provision in the Nebraska Constitution requiring the boundaries of the state's election districts to follow county
lines whenever "practicable."5 In Day v. Nelson,6 the court apparently
interpreted this provision to require that the legislature respect the
boundaries of any county with population within an acceptable range. 7
This Note will examine the impact of the court's decision in Day, noting the potential for conflict between the holding of the court and the
requirements imposed upon a redistricting legislature by the state
constitution, the Constitution of the United States, and other federal
law.
Part II begins with a historical discussion of the state and federal
requirements of equal population, compactness, contiguity, and the respect for county boundaries, providing the framework in which a Nebraska redistricting legislature must operate. Part III provides a
discussion of the Day opinion itself, presenting the relevant facts and
the court's path to its interpretation of the Nebraska county line
provision.
Part IV closely examines the interactive nature of the many requirements placed upon a redistricting legislature, and concludes that
the holding of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Day v. Nelson has the
potential to conflict with the anti-discrimination and anti-gerryman1. See Martin H. Redish, Political Consensus, ConstitutionalFormulae,and the Rationale for Judicial Review, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 1340, 1346 (1990).
2. But see Bernard Grofman, Criteriafor Districting:A Social Science Perspective,
33 UCLA L. REv. 77, 171 (1985)(strict adherence to such restrictions cannot be
relied upon to prevent impropriety in redistricting, and may simply provide a
"cloak of legitimacy" to a gerrymandered plan).
3. See discussion infra section II.B.
4. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5.
5. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5.
6. 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992).
7. Id. at 1000-01, 485 N.W.2d at 586. See also Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 92096 (1992).
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dering8 standards of the United States Constitution and other federal
law. It then presents an alternate interpretation of the provision
which would give the legislature the flexibility necessary to comply
with the many requirements placed upon it. Part IV ends with a discussion of a plausible motivation for the decision of the Day court.
Part V concludes the note with a brief summary and suggestions for
future Nebraska legislators confronted with the task of legislative redistricting after Day.
II.

BACKGROUND

The state of Nebraska is divided into 49 single-member voting districts encompassing its 93 counties. The 49 representatives elected
from those districts form Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature. 9 The
Legislature itself has the responsibility to redraw the boundaries of
the state's legislative districts as required after each federal decennial
census.10 In order to protect the rights of individual voters, as well as
certain groups of voters, the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Nebraska provide several checks on the
potential abuse of this responsibility by the Legislature, such as equality of population, compactness, contiguity, and the respect for political
boundaries."1
A.

Equal Population

Imagine a state with a two member legislature and only two voting
districts. Suppose that District One of this state contains 100 citizens.
District Two, on the other hand, contains only 10 citizens. Since each
district will elect only one representative to the legislature, it is clear
that the citizens of District Two have 10 times the voting strength of
citizens of District One. As a result, the citizens of District One are
likely to be unhappy with the legislative apportionment plan describing the boundaries of the state's voting districts.12
8. Gerrymandering is "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries
and populations for partisan or personal political purposes." Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969). The term is also used to describe racially discriminatory apportionment of legislative districts.
9. For a historical discussion of Nebraska's unique Unicameral Legislature, see
ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, ONE HOUSE FOR TWo: NEBRASKA'S UNICAMERAL

LEGISLATURE (1957).
10. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5.
11. Historically, the requirements of compactness, contiguity and respect for political
boundaries were to facilitate transportation and communication within a district.
Today, they serve "indirect" goals, such as preserving communities of interest.
BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 33 (1984).
12. This simplified example assumes that all citizens are eligible, registered voters.
For an examination of the complex problems of voter registration, see Mark
Thomas Quinlivan, One Person, One Vote Revisited: The Impending Necessity of
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In 1964, a similar situation reached the United States Supreme
Court. In Reynolds v. Sims,13 the legislative districts of the State of
Alabama had not been redrawn since the 1900 census. 14 Due to shifts
in the population distribution of the state, the districts of the existing
apportionment plan had large population deviations.'5 The existing
plan was challenged, and the Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, seats in a state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis.16 This concept of "one person, one
vote"17 is intended to ensure that each person's vote has approximately the same mathematical weight.18 Recognizing the difficulty of
achieving exact mathematical equality among districts, the Reynolds
Court held that a good faith effort is required of the legislature to construct districts of as nearly equal population as is practicable.19
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court refined the Constitutional requirement of equal population set forth in Reynolds.20 Ultimately, the Court set a threshold of a 10% population deviation among
districts, beyond which the state is required to justify its apportionment plan. 2 ' Population deviations less than 10% are considered de
minimis. 22 This requirement of equal population, established under
Equal Protection doctrine, is settled constitutional law.23
Since the population of a state is in constant flux, periodic adjustment to the boundaries of voting districts is necessary for the state to
continue to satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal population

13.
14.
-15.
16.

*17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

JudicialIntervention in the Realm of Voter Registration,137 U. PA. L. REV. 2361
(1989).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 540.
Id
1d. at 568. The Reynolds court held that "the seats in both houses of a bicameral
state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." Id. Noting that
seats of the United States Senate are not similarly apportioned, the court held the
"federal analogy" inapposite. 1d, at 573.
This famous phrase was used by Justice Douglas in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
381 (1963).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
1d.
See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
(1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973).
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)(citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,
418 (1977) and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973)).
1d.
See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407
(1977), White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973). See also John R. Low-Beer, Note, The ConstitutionalImperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163 (1984); Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Question in Political
Gerrymandering,33 UCLA L. REv. 185 (1985).
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among its districts. 24 Consequently, states generally require that their
legislative districts be reapportioned on a population basis after each
federal decennial census.25
B.

Compactness, Contiguity, and Respect for Political Boundaries

Even subject to the requirement of substantially equal population
among districts, the process of legislative reapportionment is not without its abuses. For example, the majority political party may attempt
to construct districts in a manner most favorable to that party. In creating a redistricting plan, that party may divide groups of the minority
political party in order to ensure the continued election of the majority party's incumbent representatives. 2 6 This technique is referred to
as political or partisan gerrymandering, 27 and has been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court as a justiciable wrong in violation of
28
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States.
Similarly, the legislature may apportion legislative districts in a racially discriminatory fashion.29 They may attempt to stack minority
votes into one district in order to minimize their influence in other
districts.30 Alternatively, they may attempt to split minority votes
31
among many districts, thereby diluting their overall voting strength.
The Supreme Court has determined that this type of discrimination,
known as minority vote dilution or racial gerrymandering, may be a
violation of the Voting Rights Act of 196532 and the Equal Protection
24. See In re Reapportionment of Town of Hartland, 624 A.2d 323, 325 (Vt. 1993).
25. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 200; MD. CONST. art. III, § 5; NEB. CONsT. art. III,
§ 5; Wyo. CONST. art. 3, § 48.

26. The majority party may attempt to protect incumbents in other ways. This was a
major contention of the Appellants in Day v. Nelson. Brief for Appellants at 9-11,
Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992)(No. S-92-0229). See discussion
infra section IV.F.
27. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: PartisanGerrymandering
and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987); David L. Anderson, Note, When Restraint RequiresActivism PartisanGerrymanderingand
the Status Quo Ante, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1549 (1990).
28. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986). For an interesting discussion of the
jurisprudence of political gerrymandering after Davis, see Evan Geldzahler,
Comment, Davis v. Bandemer: Remedial Difficulties in PoliticalGerrymandering, 37 EMORY L.J. 443 (1988); Jon M. Anderson, Comment, Politicsand Purpose:
Hide and Seek in the GerrymanderingThicket after Davis v. Bandemer, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 183 (1987).
29. See generally Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymanderingand Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984).
30. Id. at 92.
31. Il at 89. This technique is also referred to as "cracking."
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (1988). See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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Clause. 33
One major symptom of these types of creative apportionment is the
existence of irregularly shaped districts.34 The gerrymandering legislature will often have to stretch and twist district boundaries to reach
the desired political or racially discriminatory results. 35 As a result,
many state constitutions contain provisions providing objective geometric standards for the creation of legislative districts. Compactness
36
and contiguity are the most common examples of these standards.
A compact district has been defined as one that is "closely united in
territory." 3 7 Although such a definition may be difficult to apply, the
Illinois Supreme Court has recognized compactness as an appropriate
anti-gerrymandering standard. 38 If a legislature is required to create
geometrically compact districts, it will be more difficult for them to
39
stretch districts to reach discriminatory results.
The standard of contiguity is somewhat more clear. A contiguous
district is one that "cannot be made up of two or more pieces of detached territory."40 Like the requirement of compactness, this requirement also tends to make it more difficult for a legislature to
intentionally dilute the votes of political or racial minorities.
Many state constitutions, in addition to the requirements of equal
population, compactness, and contiguity, require some degree of re4
spect for the boundaries of political subdivisions, typically counties. 1
33. See, emg.,Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
34. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2841 (1993)(White, J. dissenting)("Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful indicator
that some form of gerrymandering (racial or other) might have taken place"); but
see BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 32 (1984) (noting that irregularly shaped districts are not necessarily "bad," and that neatly geometric districts are not always preferable).
35. See generally CAIN, supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. IX, § 200 (requiring equal population, contiguity, and
respect for county boundaries); MD. CONST. art. III, § 4 (requiring compactness,
"adjoining territory," and substantially equal population); NEB. CONST. art. III,
§ 5 (requiring equal population, compactness, contiguity, and respect for county
boundaries); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 3 (requiring equal population and respect for
county boundaries).
37. Wisconsin State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 634 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
38. Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. 1991).
39. See CAIN, supra note 34. For a thorough discussion of compactness as related to
cases of racial vote dilution, see Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The
Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1989).
40. Wisconsin State AFL-CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 630, 634 (E.D. Wis.
1982)(quoting State e= rel Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 57 (1892)).
41. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 200 ("No county shall be divided between two districts"); MD. CONST. art. III, § 4 ("Due regard shall be given to ... the boundaries
of political subdivisions"); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5 ("county lines shall be followed whenever practicable"); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 13 ("the General Assembly
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In addition to providing another objective anti-gerrymandering standard to the legislature, this type of requirement serves several other
purposes. Since voters are generally familiar with the boundaries of
their county, the county line may be an administratively convenient
district boundary.42 Also, county governments may wish to have an
exclusive voice in the state legislature. 43 In addition, "the sense of
community derived from established governmental units tends to foster effective representation." 44
III.
A.

DAY V. NELSON45

Facts of the Case

Upon the completion of the 1990 federal decennial census, the Nebraska Legislature set out to reapportion the state's 49 legislative districts as required by the Nebraska Constitution. 46 The 1990 census
showed a general shift of population from Nebraska's rural areas to its
urban centers, Douglas, Lancaster and Sarpy Counties. 47 In order for
the new apportionment plan to satisfy the requirement of substantially .equal population, it was necessary for the Legislature to create
two additional districts in the area of these urban counties.48 To retain
the state's 49 districts, the Legislature had to eliminate two districts in
other parts of the state.49
To aid in the redistricting process, a committee of the Nebraska
Legislature drafted guidelines for reapportionment.50 Among these
was the recommendation that districts of the new plan not deviate
more than 2% from the "ideal" district population, calculated as the
total population of the state divided by the number of districts.51 This
standard is well below the 10% threshold suggested by the United
States Supreme Court.52 The Legislature considered the proposed
plans, and in June 1991 Nebraska's new legislative redistricting plan,
L.B. 614, was passed into law.53

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

shall seek to ... adhere to boundaries of counties and other existing political
subdivisions"); Wyo. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("Each county shall constitute a senatorial and representative district").
See In re Reapportionment of Town of Hartland, 624 A.2d 323, 330 (1993).
Id.
Id. (quoting Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68, 88 (D.Colo. 1982)).
240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992).
NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5. See discussion supra section II.A.
Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 999, 485 N.W.2d 583, 585 (1992).
Id. at 999-1000, 485 N.W.2d at 585.
Id.
Id. at 999, 485 N.W.2d at 585.
Id. Only two of Nebraska's 93 counties, Lincoln and Madison, satisfied the 2%
maximum population deviation guideline of the committee. IdId. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.

53. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 50-1101 to 50-1152 (Supp. 1991).
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Madison County, in northeastern Nebraska, had historically been
treated as a single voting district or the great majority of one. 54 Applying the common definitions, Madison County appears to be a compact and contiguous territory.5 5 Since the 1990 census showed that the
population of Madison County was within the guidelines set forth by
the committee,5 6 Madison County apparently satisfied all of the requirements demanded of a valid legislative district s 7 Nevertheless,
L.B. 614 eliminated Madison County's district, District 21, dividing the
population of Madison County among the neighboring Districts 18 and
40.58 Unhappy with the elimination of their district, several citizens of
Madison County brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of L.B. 614.59
B.

Applicable Law

Article III, section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska
addresses the legislative redistricting process. That provision
provides:
At the regular session of the Legislature held in the year nineteen hundred
and thirty-five the Legislature shall by law determine the number of members to be elected and divide the state into legislative districts. In the creation
of such districts, any county that contains population sufficient to entitle it to
two or more members of the Legislature shall be divided into separate and
distinct legislative districts, as nearly equal in populationas may be and composed of contiguous and compact territory. One member of the Legislature
shall be elected from each such district. The basis of apportionment shall be
the population excluding aliens, as shown by the next preceding federal census. The Legislatureshall redistrictthe state after eachfederal decennialcensus. In any such redistricting, county lines shall be followed whenever
practicable,but other established lines may be followed at the discretionof the
Legislature.6 0

This provision incorporates the requirements of equal population,
compactness, contiguity, and respect for county boundaries.
C. Claims and Holding
The Day plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that L.B. 614 was in
violation of article III, section 5 of the Nebraska Constitution. 6'
54. Brief for Appellants at 6, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992)(No.
S-92-0229).
55. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
56. Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 999, 485 N.W.2d 583, 585 (1992).
57. In addition, Madison County was one of only ten Nebraska counties to experience
a population increase over the preceding decade. 1d. at 999, 485 N.W.2d at 585.
58. Id. at 1000, 485 N.W.2d at 585.
59. Id. at 998, 485 N.W.2d at 584.
60. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5 (emphasis added).
61. In addition to the alleged violation of the Nebraska Constitution, the Madison
County plaintiffs claimed that L.B. 614 was in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and that it was enacted in violation of the Due Process Clause. Brief for Appel-
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Although the district court disagreed and upheld the plan, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the Madison County
62
plaintiffs.
The court reasoned that since other plans were proposed to the legislature that left Madison County intact, and the population of
Madison County was within a constitutionally acceptable range, it was
"practicable" to follow the Madison County line, within the meaning
of article III, section 5.63 Since L.B. 614 did not follow the Madison
County line, those sections of the redistricting plan which divided
Madison County6 4 were in violation of article III, § 5 of the Nebraska
Constitution, and were therefore enjoined from enforcement. 65
IV.

ANALYSIS

The "Practicability" of Following County Lines

A.

After Day, the court would apparently hold that if any county has
been treated as its own district on any proposed redistricting plan, and
that county satisfies the requirement of substantially equal population, it is "practicable" to respect that county's borders in a redistricting plan.66 Consequently, without any analysis of the plan as a whole,
the Legislature must consider that county as its own district in the
67
new plan of reapportionment.
There is a potential conflict between this apparently absolute requirement of respecting the boundaries of a sufficiently populous
county and the equal population requirement itself as applied to an
entire redistricting plan. 6s A legislature must have the flexibility to
reach a balance among the many restrictions placed upon it in creating
a legislative apportionment plan. 69 The result of Day v. Nelson may
restrict that flexibility, and future compliance with the Day holding

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

lants at 2, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992)(No. S-92-0229).
However, this Note is limited to the effects of the Plaintiffs' successful claim
under the Nebraska Constitution.
Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 1001, 485 N.W.2d 583, 586 (1992).
Id.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 50-1119, 50-1141 (Supp. 1991) (superseded by NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 50-1119.01, 50-1141.01 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 1001, 485 N.W.2d 583, 586 (1992).
See Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 92096 (1992).
Id.
See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 853 (1983)(Brennan, J. dissenting)("We have
warned that although maintenance of county or other political boundaries can
justify small deviations [in population], it cannot be allowed to negate the fundamental principle of one person, one vote.")
Id at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring)("There must be flexibility in assessing the
size of the deviation against the importance, consistency, and neutrality of the
state policies alleged to require the population disparities.") See also In re Reapportionment of Town of Hartland, 624 A.2d 323, 326 (Vt. 1993)("[T]he Legislature
must resolve the tension that exists between the one-person, one-vote require-
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could result in a violation of other restrictions on redistricting. 70
B. Compromise Among the Requirements
Restrictions on redistricting can be split into two general categories: numerical restrictions and nonnumerical restrictions. 7 ' The numerical category contains the requirement of equal population under
the Equal Protection Clause. The goal of this requirement is to ensure
mathematical equality among votes throughout the state.72 The nonnumerical category contains requirements such as compactness, contiguity, and the respect for political boundaries.73 One goal of this
group is to provide voters with fair and effective representation. 74 Another goal of this group is to create an administratively workable redistricting plan. Restrictions in these categories must work together
to guarantee a plan that is fair, neutral, and reasonable. 75
Taken alone, the numerical restrictions would result in perfect
mathematical equality of voting strength among the voters of all districts. However, the possibilities of gerrymandering or racial vote dilution are not checked by this Constitutional requirement. 76 At
another extreme, the nonnumerical requirements taken alone might
neutralize such creative apportionment, but would result in inequality
of voting strength between voters of different districts in any state
with a less than perfectly uniform population distribution.77
Clearly, a balance must be reached among these restrictions to allow both equal voting strength and fair and effective representation in

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.
77.

ment and state laws concerning the maintenance of compact and contiguous districts made up of communities with common interests.")
In fact, the Legislature's response to Day,LB 7, which reapportioned and renumbered parts of districts 18, 19, and 40, has since been challenged. In that action the
Plaintiff claimed that LB 7 violated her constitutional right to run for public office, her First Amendment Right to freedom of association, and her Fourteenth
Amendent right to due process. However, Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction was denied by the U.S. District Court of Nebraska. Carlson v. Nelson,
No. 4: CV92-3300 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 1992)(Order denying preliminary injunction).
In re Reapportionment of Town of Hartland, 624 A.2d 323, 329 (Vt. 1993).
Id See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and discussion supra section II.A.
In re Reapportionment of Town of Hartland, 624 A.2d 323, 328-29 (Vt. 1993).
Id.
It is interesting to note that computer models have been employed, with limited
success, to try to reach a perfect compromise among the restrictions placed upon
a redistricting legislature. See, e.g., Michelle H. Browdy, Simulated Annealing:
An Improved Computer Model for PoliticalRedistricting, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 163 (1990).
See In re Reapportionment of Town of Hartland, 624 A.2d 323, 334 (Vt. 1993).
See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 845 (1983)("Even a neutral and consistently
applied criterion such as use of counties as representative districts can frustrate
Reynolds' mandate of fair and effective representation").
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a workable redistricting plan. 78 At first glance, it would appear that
the Nebraska Supreme Court reached just that result in Day v. Nelson. The court found that Madison County, a historically recognized
political subdivision, apparently compact and contiguous and containing nearly the ideal district population, should remain a unitary district.79 However, this decision arguably misinterprets the county line
requirement of the Nebraska Constitution. This interpretation has
the potential to carry far beyond the facts of Madison County, Nebraska, in 1991.
In Day, the court states that "[ilt is obvious that according to the
plain language of Article III, section 5, Madison County must constitute a single district unless not 'practicable.' "80 It then conclusively
asserts that "[i]t is also obvious that the presence of a number of plans
that apportion the state leaving District 21 [Madison County] substantially intact makes following that county's boundaries 'practicable.' "81
It is this "obvious" meaning of the term "practicable," reached by the
court without reason or analysis, that is potentially problematic.
C. The Redistricting "Puzzle"
A redistricting plan has been compared to a puzzle.8 2 Like the
pieces of a puzzle, each district of a plan must fit perfectly together
with the next, with the resulting completed puzzle exhausting the territory of the state. There can be no gaps nor overlapping pieces. In
this puzzle, each piece is constitutionally required to encompass approximately the same number of citizens.8 3 Consequently, any adjustment to or restriction placed upon a boundary of a piece causes a chain
reaction of necessary adjustments to the other pieces, potentially
throughout the entire state.8 4 A redistricting plan, therefore, cannot
be discretely analyzed in terms of its individual districts since there is
an interactive relationship among the boundaries of all of its districts.8 5 A plan must be analyzed in its entirety to determine if follow86
ing a certain county line is "practicable."

Id. at 845-46.
Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 1001, 485 N.W.2d 583, 586 (1992).
Id- at 1000-01, 485 N.W.2d at 586.
Id- atl1001, 485 N.W.2d at 586.
See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See discussion supra section II.A.
Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 92098 (1992)("a change in one aspect of a plan may have an
impact on other aspects of the plan").
85. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 857-58 (1983)(Brennan, J., dissenting)(rejecting the majority's assumption that one feature of a plan can be "severed" and analyzed in isolation).
86. Brief for Appellees at 10-11, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583
(1992)(No. S-92-0229). See also Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 859 (1983)(Brennan, J. dissenting)("Only by analyzing the plan 'in its totality' may we judge
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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However, the Day court seems to employ a district-by-district analysis in its reasoning, ignoring the potential effects of one district on
the entire plan.8 7 Following Day, it appears that if any county contains population sufficient to satisfy the requirement of substantially
equal population, and has been proposed to the Legislature as its own
district, that county may be able to enjoin the enforcement of any redistricting plan that fails to respect its boundaries.88 This result does
not recognize the interactive nature of districts within a given plan.
There must be give and take among the requirements imposed
upon the legislature, as well as the physical restrictions imposed by
the geography of the state and the distribution of its population. This
flexibility is necessary to complete the "puzzle" of reapportionment.8 9
Following Day, in creating a redistricting plan, those districts with
satisfactory populations must be the fixed starting point for the legislators, since there is little flexibility granted to the legislature with
respect to these counties.9 0 The flexibility necessary to complete the
"puzzle," exhausting the territory of the state without any overlapping
districts, must then be exercised in drawing the boundaries of the remaining districts.91 In a state like Nebraska, with a widely variable
population distribution, one potential result of such a rigid starting
point is the creation of irregularly shaped districts that are not compact or contiguous, or districts that violate the requirement of equal
population.92 As long as the requirement of equal population is considered paramount,9 3 then the standards of compactness and contiguity may have to be abandoned, leaving the door open to
gerrymandering. 94 The interactive nature of the boundaries of voting
districts, therefore, has the potential to translate the rigid enforcement of a state constitutional provision into a violation of established
federal requirements.
A more reasonable reading of the county line provision would
whether the allocation of any seat in the House is constitutional")(citation
omitted).
87. Justice Brennan pointed out the difficulties associated with attempting to sever
one district from an entire plan in his dissent in Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835,
856-60 (1983).
88. Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 1000-01, 485 N.W.2d 583, 586 (1992). See also Neb. Op.
Att'y Gen. 92096 (1992).

89. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 853 (1983)(Brennan, J. dissenting).
90. Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 92096 (1992).

91. I& at 3-4.
92. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 841, 844 (1983). However, the problem arguably is easier to avoid in a state like Nebraska where the number of election
districts greatly exceeds the number of counties.
93. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). See also Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 92096
(1992).
94. Brief for Appellees at 16, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992)(No.
S-92-0229).
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leave the Legislature with the flexibility needed to accommodate the
many restrictions placed upon it. The county line restriction should
not be considered mandatory, even for counties with populations sufficient to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. 95 Initially, the term
"practicable" must take the entire "puzzle" into consideration, rather
than examining each county individually.9 6 Under this reading, if a
plan respecting the boundaries of certain counties would result in
other counties being noncompact, noncontiguous or unacceptably disparate in population, then respecting the boundaries of those certain
97
counties is not practicable.
Although the court states that other plans were proposed leaving
Madison County substantially intact, 98 it refuses to address the reasons that the Legislature discarded these other plans in favor of L.B.
614. Perhaps these proposed plans contained districts that were not
compact or contained unacceptable population deviations among districts. There may have been many factors which would have rendered
the respect of Madison County's borders impracticable, considering
the apportionment plan as a whole. 99
As long as redistricting remains a legislative function, the Legislature appears to be in a superior position to make an informed decision
as to which redistricting plans are "practicable," considered in their
entirety. Simply because a plan apparently results in politically
favorable consequences should not deem it invalid.00 The court's assertion that the proposal of alternative plans which respected the
Madison County line automatically renders following the County line
"practicable" does not withstand a realistic analysis in light of the actual process of legislative reapportionment.
D.

Discretion of the Legislature

In addition to its questionable reading of the term "practicable,"
the court ignores some of the plain language of the provision that it
claims to be following. In its brief conclusion, the court states that the
State of Nebraska, in its more permissive interpretation of the county
95. Brief for Appellees at 9-10, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583
(1992)(No. S-92-0229).
96. Id. at 10, 11. See also Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 859 (1983).
97. Brief for Appellees at 10-11, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583
(1992)(No. S-92-0229).
98. Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 1000, 485 N.W.2d 583, 586 (1992).
99. Appellees noted that "each of the various plans submitted ... called for splitting
of counties.... The principal difference between the plans was in which counties
would end up being split." Brief of Appellees at 6, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997,
485 N.W.2d 583 (1992)(No. S-92-0229). Interestingly, Appellees also contended
that the Appellants' favored plan would have split Madison County as well. Id. at
14.
100. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129 (1986).
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line provision, "ignores the mandatory 'shall' in the constitutional section and would equate it with the permissive 'may.' "101 However, the
court has apparently not completed its reading of the last sentence of
the provision, which states that "[iun any such redistricting, county
lines shall be followed whenever practicable, but other established
lines may be followed at the discretion of the Legislature."o2 The
plain meaning of this clause clearly adds a discretionary element to
the requirement. 0 3 Whether or not L.B. 614 actually followed "established lines" in its division of Madison County is not important. What
is important is that the court's holding in Day effectively nullifies this
patently discretionary language, at least in the case of a sufficiently
populous county. Borrowing another quote upon which the court relies, "[ilt is a fundamental principle of constitutional interpretation
that each and every clause within a constitution has been inserted for
a useful purpose."104 Yet, the court appears to have ignored any purpose that this particular discretionary clause may have. 05
E. Brown v. Thomson106 Distinguished
It has been argued that the benefits of respecting county boundaries are so great that they should outweigh the equal population and
anti-gerrymandering requirements. As discussed above, 07 a county
boundary is an administratively convenient district boundary, since
the local voter is generally familiar with his county. In addition,
county governments may wish to have their own voice in the legislature and may not want to share their representative with another
county.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, under certain circumstances, the desire to maintain county boundaries may be a
sufficient justification for deviations from population equality.O8 In
Brown v. Thomson, the 1981 Wyoming legislative apportionment plan
strictly followed county boundaries in order to fulfill the state's constitutional guarantee of at least one representative to each county. 09
The resulting districts showed significant deviations among their
101. Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 1001, 485 N.W.2d 586, 586 (1992).
102. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5 (emphasis added).
103. Brief for Appellees at 9-10, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 883
(1992)(No. S-92-0229).
104. Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 1000, 485 N.W.2d 583, 585-86 (1992)(quoting Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967)).
105. Brief for Appellees at 9-10, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583
(1992)(No. S-92-0229).
106. 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
107. See discussion supra section II.B.
108. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 847 (1982).
109. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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populations.11O However, despite these gross violations of the equal
population standard, the Court upheld the plan.",
The Court's reasoning in Brown, however, does not lend itself to
the facts underlying Day. To be sure, the Court recognized the benefits of respecting county boundaries, but did so only under limited circumstances. The Brown Court stressed the fact that the requirement
of respect for county boundaries was a mandatory requirement of the
Wyoming Constitution.12 In addition, the court considered it important that the mandatory requirement of respecting county boundaries
had been consistently applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion since
Wyoming's statehood.113 Under these circumstances, the Wyoming
county line requirement was held to advance a rational state interest
justifying deviation from the equal population principle.114
In contrast to Wyoming's longstanding constitutional requirement,
even under the Day court's reading of the Nebraska constitutional
provision it can hardly be contended that Nebraska's "requirement" of
following county lines is mandatory. Such a reading is contrary to the
plain meaning of the provision, regardless of how the term "practicable" is interpreted.s1 5
The narrow reach of the Court's holding in Brown was stressed by
Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion,n1 6 and another court has
referred to the Brown decision as "an aberration with little precedential value."117
F.

Possible Motivation of the Court

A closer look at the facts surrounding the conflict resulting in Day
v. Nelson reveals a possible motivation for the court's decision. The
chairman of the committee in charge of structuring the redistricting
plan was a state senator from another northeastern Nebraska
county.11s Although several of the proposed plans divided this senator's county among other districts, the committee, and ultimately the
110. The challenged plan had an average population deviation of 16% and a maximum
deviation of 89%. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 846 (1983).
111. Id. at 847.

112. Id at 843.
113. Id at 843-44.
114. Id at 848.
115. See Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. 92096 (1992)("the court in the Day case seems to equate
the term 'practicable'... with 'possible' ").
116. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 850 (1983)(Brennan, J., dissenting)("[I]t is worth
stressing how extraordinarily narrow [the Court's holding] is, and how empty of
likely precedential value").
117. In re Reapportionment of Town of Hartland, 624 A.2d 323, 333 (Vt. 1993).
118. Brief for Appellants at 9-11, Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583

(1992)(No. S-92-0229).
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Legislature, chose L.B. 614.119 The Day plaintiffs believed that this
senator used his influence as chairman to obtain the passage of L.B.
614.120 They argued that he was attempting to preserve his district in
order to remain in office.121 Perhaps the court agreed, and felt that it
was punishing a gerrymandering state senator by finding for the
Madison County plaintiffs and enjoining certain portions of L.B. 614.
Whether this scenario is accurate or not in this particular case
misses the point. If the court wanted to punish this senator by enjoining his plan, it could have done so explicitly by considering the
practicability of the other proposed plans in their entirety. In fact, it is
not inconceivable that a plan could have been constructed that
respected the borders of Madison County while allowing the entire
plan to satisfy the requirements of equal population, contiguity, compactness, and even the respect of the boundaries of other sufficiently
populous counties. But rather than conducting this type of analysis on
the alternative plans, the court apparently chose to examine Madison
County in isolation.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the holding in Day v. Nelson appears at first glance to be
the rigorous enforcement of a provision of the Nebraska Constitution,
a closer reading of that provision reveals that the Nebraska Supreme
Court has chosen to enjoin properly enacted state legislation through
an erroneous interpretation of that provision. The result of this interpretation is that future legislators, constitutionally bound to create
districts of equal population, will also be required to respect the
boundaries of certain counties. It is possible that the imposition of
these two requirements will result in a redistricting plan with
noncompact, noncontiguous districts. This, in itself, is a violation of
article III, section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska. It
also creates a climate conducive to discriminatory apportionment, by
providing a pre-existing excuse for irregularly shaped districts.
Future Nebraska legislators, in creating plans of apportionment,
must attempt to reconcile the holding in Day with the constitutional
requirements of equal population, compactness, and contiguity. These
requirements must be harmonized, if "practicable," through careful
planning in the process of redistricting. More often than not, it would
appear that careful redistricting will allow all of these requirements to
be satisfied. However, if reconciliation of these provisions is not possible and a plan is challenged under the county line provision, the proponents of the plan must attempt to make a clearer showing of why
119. Id at 9-11.
120. Id.
121. Id at 10.
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alternative plans are somehow not "practicable," even though they
were proposed. They may attempt to show that, considering the redistricting plan in its entirety, it is not possible to leave the county in
question intact without leaving the plan open to other challenges
under the Constitution of the United States. The situation may demand a choice between a violation of the county line "requirement" of
the Nebraska Constitution and a violation of the mandate of substantially equal population promulgated under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. Or, since the Supreme
Court has stated that the requirement of equal population is to be considered paramount, 122 the choice may be between a violation of the
county line "requirement" and the requirements of compactness and
contiguity-the intention of which is to prevent discriminatory apportionment. In either case, the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution 123 suggests that the demands of federal law be respected
and the provisions of the state constitution be relaxed.
The Day opinion may still allow a showing of "impracticability" in
a proposed plan, considered as a whole. This showing may remove the
plan from the rule of Day requiring strict adherence to county lines.
The plain language of the Nebraska constitutional provision is consistent with this interpretation, and perhaps future Nebraska courts will
attempt to narrowly limit the holding in Day to its facts.
T. ParkerSchenken '94

122. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
123. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

